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I. INTRODUCTION: THE SKEPTICAL START
The fact that human rights are a relatively novel instrument of social justice
is belied by the numerous conventions and extensive organizations that exist
for their advocacy, for their definition, and for their delivery. Their relative
novelty is further belied by an apparently universal consensus as to their
symbolic significance, most paradoxically displayed by the sense of righteous-
ness with which competing claims to rights are invariably asserted in so many
varied conflicts, whether domestic or international, individual or collective.
But even this consensus disappears in the face of claims to "sexual rights," as
the established notion that national, regional, or religious values cannot trump
human rights is frequently negated in a flurry of contention and appeals for
discretion in the name of cultural integrity.'
The broad array of claims that might be defined as sexual rights have been
developed over the last few decades to an extent that is constantly constrained
by this lack of consensus. Resistance to the recognition of sexual rights tends
to derive from reactions that range from that of the skeptical jurist to one of
outright refusal on the grounds of ideological dogma. In this Comment, I
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For more on this, and a discussion of the international advance of rights around sexual
orientation in particular, see Ignacio Saiz, Bracketing Sexuality: Human Rights and Sexual
Orientation-A Decade of Development and Denial at the UN, HEALTH & HUM. RTs.: AN INT'L
J., July 2004, at 48.
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intend to address the former of these reactions, by considering questions that
I imagine gestating in the minds of those who have never directly encountered
the need for sexual rights: What has sexuality got to do with rights? Do sexual
rights really have a sound basis both in reality and in the jurisprudential
abstract?
This critical interrogation is sometimes carried even further with the
suggestion that making a claim for sexual rights trivializes and distracts from
other "more fundamental" human rights claims. In the southern African
context in which I work, while it is now less frequent for this claim to be made,
ten years ago many southern Africans would plainly query why they should be
worried about sexual rights when people might be jailed without due process,
tortured whilst in custody, and on release deprived of the social and economic
rights that would allow them to feed their families. Surely these are far more
fundamental rights, than the frivolous right to exercise some sexual desire?
Are sexual rights not simply a manifestation of bourgeois complacency? Do
they not simply arise when we have already established other more fundamen-
tal rights and have the time and space that allows us the indulgence to think
about them?
Fewer southern Africans now ask this question, partly because the heavy
toll of HIV/AIDS has made the importance of sexual rights undeniable to so
many ordinary southern Africans. But I would stress that this is not the only
reason: while we need to recognize that sexual rights are a fundamental
strategy for combating the spread of HIV/AIDS, that role cannot be the sole
basis for their recognition. For sexual rights to be justiciable and
transformative, they must be rationalized and reasoned for more rigorously
than as an immediate response to this desperate disease. This process has been
initiated to some extent by such rights-oriented organs as the Constitutional
Court of South Africa,2 who treat their new constitution as an explicitly
transformative (rather than simply remedial) document.3 Five out of the
2 Information on the Constitutional Court of South Africa can be found at http://www.
concourt.gov.za.
3 For example, petitioners to the Constitutional Court have successfully relied on the socio-
economic rights articulated in the Constitution to oblige the government to deliver policies on
housing and healthcare guaranteeing far more extensive provisions than those initially proposed
by the government. See Gov't of Rep. of S. Afr. v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SALR 46 (CC)
(holding that the government had an obligation to make housing more available); Minister of
Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (No. 2), 2002 (5) SALR 721 (CC) (providing an
obligation on the government to take additional steps to combat mother-to-child transimission
of HIV); see also Oliver Phillips, (Dis)Continuities of Custom in Zimbabwe and South Africa:
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sixteen prohibited grounds of discrimination relate to gender and sexuality,4
and there are as many references to social and economic rights as there are to
civil and political.5 This proactive and inclusive approach gives the constitu-
tion the potential to be an "enabling tool" through which social transformation
becomes possible given the right political context.6 But here too there are
disputed limits regarding the extent to which rights may be associated with
sexuality, particularly where conformity to normative ideals is in question.7
This Comment is therefore a brief attempt to address these fundamental
questions of how sex fits with human rights and to clarify the reason for the
fast-growing claims and increasing recognition of sexual rights as a field of
advocacy, academic research, and contested practical application. I focus on
providing a conceptual understanding of the importance of sexual rights, rather
than a detailed account of specific interpretations of treaty provisions,
landmark court rulings, specific applications, or UN Human Rights Committee
reviews.' My aim is to outline some of the needs that exist and to provide
some realization of how these needs should become established as rights.
The Implications for Gendered and Sexual Rights, HEALTH & HUM. RTs.: ANINT'LJ., July 2004,
at 82 (providing further discussion of constitutions as transformative versus remedial
documents).
' The "Equality Clause" prohibits discrimination "on one or more grounds, including race,
gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age,
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth." S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 9(3).
5 Among other rights, Chapter 2 of the Constitution guarantees the provision of adequate
housing (§ 26); health care, food, water, and social security (§ 27); and both basic and further
education (§ 29). S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2.
6 For a discussion of the South African Constitution's role as an "enabling tool," see Mikki
van Zyl, Escaping Heteronormative Bondage: Sexuality in Sexual Citizenship, in (UN)THINKING
CITIZENSHI: FEMINIST DEBATES IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA, 149 (Amanda Gouws ed.,
2005). For a consideration of its limitations in this role, see Saras Jagwanth & Christina Murray,
Ten Years of Transformation: How Has Gender Equality in South Africa Fared?, 14 CAN. J.
WOMEN & L. 255 (2002).
7 The unanimous decision of the South African Constitutional Court in S v. Jordan, 2002(6)
SALR 642 (CC), was that the criminalisation of sex work was consistent with the constitution
and that its decriminalization was a matter for the legislature. The limits of the Court's
association of rights and sexuality had clearly been reached as this represented an approach of
unprecedented caution and jurisdictional restraint. For more on this approach, see Phillips,
supra note 3, at 82, 97-99.
8 For an excellent review and analysis of the reporting of rights in relation to sexuality, see
Cynthia Rothschild, Not YourAverage Sex Story: Critical Issues in Recent Reporting on Human
Rights and Sexuality, HEALTH& HuM. RTs.: AN INT'L J., July 2004, at 165.
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HI. PRIVATE SEX AS A PUBLIC CONCERN
Feminist theory and psychoanalysis have both marked sexuality as one of
the sites at which we might start to understand the politics of intimacy and
desire. This is important because it is a pivotal arena for the intersection of
public structures and private lives. It is this public/private divide that makes
sexual rights so important and at the same time, so contentious and difficult.
It is useful to start by considering how sex is private or public. Do we want
the state in our bedrooms or not? It might be claimed that asserting a sexual
right is inviting the state into our beds, thus courting interference in something
that should be private and personal. Sex is generally a manifestation of a most
private act, an expression of deeply personal intimacy: yet it is also universally
subject to extraordinary levels of formal regulation by the State and other
public institutions, as it lies at the heart of what Foucault termed bio-power:
the State's control over demographic developments and the bodies of citizens.9
Notions of public health and public morality, not to mention assumptions of
convention and rules of religion, resonate just as powerfully in relation to sex
as do claims to privacy and freedom of association.
A simple illustration of this of most relevance to North America and
Western Europe, but of variable relevance elsewhere, is the manner in which
the process of "coming out," leaving the secrecy of the "closet" and publicly
expressing "gay pride," explicitly challenges the assumed universalism of
hetero-normativity. This process challenges the assumptions that everyone is
heterosexual and that the world should expect that everyone will be heterosex-
ual. Coming out is seen as a strategy to gay liberation, primarily because as an
act of self-disclosure, it is an act of agency that preempts the vulnerability that
comes with being exposed by another. The person coming out exercises some
choice over how and where she/he does so. Coming out implicitly delivers
greater control over when, how, and to what extent hetero-normative public
9 Foucault suggests that the imposition of an "anatamo-politics" of the individual body
(health and hygiene, work, efficiency, morality, productivity) as well as "bio-power," the
demographic regulation of the social body (registration of births, marriages, deaths, and the
development of total institutions such as schools, prisons, hostels, etc.), are significant in that
they supply the "normalizing judgment" which produces self-disciplined "obedient subjects,"
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 139-41 (Robert Hurley
trans., Penguin Books 1978), by instilling "habits, rules, orders, and authority that is exercised
continually around him and upon him and which he must allow to function automatically in
him," MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 128 (Alan
Sheridan trans., Penguin Books 1979) (1977).
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structures might intrude in a same-sex relationship. Naturally, it can only
provide this control in a social context in which there is already some sense of
community from which she/he can draw a measure of social capital and in
which she/he can find protection. There is no point in coming out if she/he
will be the only person to do so, as such notable isolation simply increases
levels of vulnerability.
The more general point is that one's ability to resist the intrusion of public
structures in one's intimate life, one's ability to assert one's own desire or,
alternatively (but perhaps more importantly), to reject an uninvited proposi-
tion, and one's ability to express consent to a sexual act, are crude but effective
measures of social power. The ability to exercise these measures of social
power places sex and pleasure at the heart of so much political struggle,
whether articulated in terms of class, race, or gender. This struggle has been
disturbingly highlighted by failed attempts in southern Africa to prevent the
transmission of HIV/AIDS as women's disproportionate vulnerability to
infection is mapped with increasing frequency as deriving from their lack of
broader social power.'" Specifically, it is clear that marriage provides no
reduction of risk but frequently heightens women's vulnerability on account
of their relative lack of power (whether economic or sexual) in a highly
gendered social order." Just as one's ability to negotiate safe sex depends on
access to power within a relationship, so the capacity to fulfill desires,
experience sexual pleasure, resist unwanted pressure, avoid obligation, and
refuse uninvited sexual advances are all mediated by our access to power in
broader social relationships.
I1. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE
Clear illustrations of the way in which sexual relations are symbolic of
broader social relations abound, but one place that they are most explicitly
visible is in the narratives of colonial conquest and their resonance in the
national imaginations of post-colonial states today. While many of the
historical examples of this phenomenon are well known, Afghanistan and Iraq
provide us with more recent instances of pertinence. The explicitly sexual
nature of the mistreatment of inmates at Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad is a
'0 See, e.g., HIV/AIDS IN AFRICA: BEYOND EPIDEMIOLOGY (Ezekiel Kalipeni et al. eds.,
2004).
" See generally AIDS, SEXUALiTY AND GENDER IN AFRICA (Carolyn Baylies & Janet Bujra,
eds., 2000).
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good example, albeit an extreme one, of how sexual power closely reflects the
power of broader social relations. Furthermore, the inclusion of British forces
in the American-led coalition that deposed the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2002
is sure to have resurrected narratives of sexual conquest that resonate
powerfully in the Afghan nationalist memory. When the British occupied
Kabul between 1839 and 1841, their licentious treatment of Afghan women
has been suggested to be one reason for the growth of a deep-seated hostility
and resentment;' 2 this was clearly manifested in 1842 in the Khyber Pass with
the killing of the 4500 retreating British and Indian troops, and nearly all
12,000 women and children who made up their camp followers. 3 Later that
year, British forces retaliated by razing Kabul's great bazaar and leaving
thousands of Afghans dead.' 4 Remembered in Britain as the "sacking of
Kabul," this is memorialized in Afghanistan with a "bitterness and resentment
of foreign influence that lasted well into the twentieth century and may have
accounted for much of the backlash against the modernization attempts of later
Afghan monarchs."' 5 It is correct to ask whether, in over 200 years of repeated
military occupation by the British, carried out in the name of bringing civilized
government to the territories of Afghanistan and Iraq, the dynamics of sexual
conquest remain the same, with men regarding women's bodies as the terrain
through which colonial subjugation is practiced and resisted. It is equally
important to recognize that this particular history of persistent military
interference accompanied by sexual appropriation and humiliation is the
context in which much of the Arab world will situate the widely publicized
treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison.
The narrative of such histories takes on a symbolic power of enormous
significance. This power is illustrated by the claims made in 2003 by a large
number of Kenyan women who had given birth to children of white fathers:
in an attempt to sue the British Army for a considerable sum these women
claimed that they were the victims of mass rape by British soldiers." Further
2 See Ronald Hyam, Empire and Sexual Opportunity, J. IMPERIAL& COMMONWEALTH HIS.,
Jan. 1986, at 34.
"3 See The First Afghan War: 1839-1842,http://www.indhistory.com/afghan-war-l.html (last
visited Apr. 14, 2005).
14 Sally Ann Baynard, The First Anglo-Afghan War, in Afghanistan: A Country Study 29
(Richard F. Nyrop & Donald M. Seekins eds., 1986), http://www.gl.iit.edu/govdocs/afghanistan/
Afghanistan-Chapter l.pdf.
15 id.




investigation called into question many (but not all) of the allegations of rape, 17
however, what is important here is that the story took this shape. The story
means that either the long history of violent male conquest continues
unchanged or, at the very least, that the memory of similar historical acts is
such a part of the post-colonial legacy that it can give a significant measure of
credibility to fabricated but expensive claims.
The 1896 Ndebele rebellion in Southern Rhodesia and the 1906 Zulu
rebellion also included explicit grievances about the British treatment of
women.'" Soon after these rebellions, in both Southern Rhodesia and Papua
New Guinea, the British imposed the death penalty for the rape, or even the
attempted rape, of a white woman by a black man; no protection was given to
black women raped by white men.' 9 Thus, the capacity to determine with
whom one has sexual relations has long been a precise indicator of social
power in that it reflects the extent of one's ability to lay claim to basic rights
of privacy and freedom of association, not to mention the protection of bodily
integrity or autonomy, and the possibility of securing these through recourse
to the law.
The above examples offer an indication of fairly predictable privileging of
race and class in a colonial context. They are historical examples and they rely
on fairly blatant examples of what are now widely accepted to be unjustifiable
inequalities of treatment, primarily because they describe the differential
regulation of sexual behaviour according to race or class, an approach that the
international condemnation of apartheid highlighted as universally unaccept-
Mulama, Tales of Rape, Sodomy by British Soldiers, (July 15, 2003), at http:Ilwww.
refusingtokill.net/rape/rightsKenya.htm; Jennifer Friedlin, Kenyan Women to Sue British Army
for Alleged Rapes (Aug. 11, 2003), at http://www.awakenedwoman.com/kenyan-Jawsuit.htm.
'" Andrew Harding, UK Says Kenya Rape Reports "Fake", BBC NEWS, at http://news.bbc.
co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/3140592.stm (last updated Sept. 25, 2003).
" See Hyam, supra note 12, at 34.
19 See John Pape, Black and White: The 'Perils of Sex' in Colonial Zimbabwe, 16 J. S. AFR.
STUD. 699 (1990); see also Oliver Phillips, Sexual Offences in Zimbabwe: Fetishisms of
Procreation, Perversion, and Individual Autonomy (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Cambridge) (on file with author).
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able.20 However, many sexual rights are not so unambiguously presented as
universally applicable.
The examples cited above also refer to sexual violence and this element of
violence has served as a point of agreement across different cultures in an area
fraught with disagreement. The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
Against Women, adopted in December 1993 by the UN General Assembly,
emphasizes that the various forms of violence against women occur in the
family and in the community, and can be perpetrated or condoned by the State;
it also affirms that violence against women "constitutes a violation of the rights
and fundamental freedoms of women."'" It specifically addresses "physical,
sexual, and psychological" violence in public and private life22 and reflects a
consensus that sexual violence should be abhorred. It is arguable that there is
international recognition that it is impossible to justify the infliction of sexual
violence. This is evidenced by the fact that even where there is a report of its
perpetration by state-sanctioned militia (such as in the former Yugoslavia or
in present-day Zimbabwe), there is an official attempt on the part of the state
to deny or be distanced from it. However, even this approach towards sexual
violence is only a very recent consensus, and, as will be seen, the premise of
protection is a difficult foundation for the promotion of further rights implying
equality and agency.
A cursory glance at the development of domestic regimes of law and the
definition of the crime of rape in many cultures around the world, including the
Roman law that yields such a historical influence over Anglo-American and
European law, indicates that only recently has the law against rape become
preoccupied with protecting bodily integrity. Historically, the Roman law on
20 "States ... condemn racial segregation and apartheid and undertake to prevent, prohibit
and eradicate all practices of this nature...." International Convention on the Suppression and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, openedforsignature Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243,
244 (hereinafter Apartheid Convention]. Recognizing that the Apartheid Convention was never
ratified by major powers such as the United States, Great Britain, France, Canada, and Japan, and
that the Convention has thirty-one signatories and 101 parties, Apartheid Convention, Status of
Ratifications, Reservations and Declarations, http:/www.unhchr.chlhtmllmenu3/b/treaty8-
asp.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2005), it is nevertheless arguable that its lack of status in
international law does not match the significant consensus reflected in its content. The
condemnation of apartheid is exemplified in the historic isolation of the pre-1994 apartheid
South Africa and the consequent reentry of the post-1994 democratic South Africa into
international organizations and communities.
21 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 481104, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess. at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (1993).
22 Id. art. 1 (emphasis added).
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rape was closely related to the law against abduction. The legacy of this
relationship is that many subsequent legal regimes were primarily concerned
with protecting a woman as the property of a man. Until recently, the legal
definition of rape was limited to forcible penetration of the vagina with a
penis-in many countries this is still the case. At earlier stages, there was
frequently a requirement of ejaculation. In many legal regimes, a husband
could rape his wife with impunity. Considered together, all these factors can
lead to no other conclusion than that the primary objective of the law was to
protect a man's exclusive access to his wife's reproductive system. Only in the
last twenty to thirty years has widespread reform of the laws against rape in
many jurisdictions placed the protection of a person's bodily integrity and
sexual autonomy at the centre of a rape complaint.23 This recent development
provides an indication of just how young and underdeveloped the notion of
rights relating to sexual behavior and the concept of sexual autonomy might
be.
TV. A CRITICAL LOOK AT SEXUAL HARM AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
The current incontestability of a woman's right to protection from sexual
harm is a testament to the effectiveness of feminist campaigning, as women
from North and South have highlighted the need for state engagement in
protecting women from sexual abuse. Although the terms "sexual" or
"reproductive" rights may be traced to movements that initially surfaced in
North America and Europe, similar yet distinct movements on behalf of
women's reproductive health and rights rapidly formed during the early to mid-
1980s in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. This global movement was not only
significant in developing the notion of sexual rights, but also impelled official
recognition in the form of various statements concerning women's rights.24
23 For example, over the last five years, the laws defining sexual offenses in England and
Wales have been reformed on the explicit premise of protecting the vulnerable while still
recognizing the need for autonomy. U.K. HOME OFFICE, SETTINGTHE BOUNDARIES: REFORMING
THE LAWON SEX OFFENCES H 0.6-0.7, at iv (2000), available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/
docs/vol l main.pdf. As a result, rape is now defined as the non-consensual penile penetration
of vagina, anus, or mouth (of either a man or a woman), while other definitions of serious sexual
assault are completely non-gender-specific. Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42 § 1 (Eng.).
24 In 1994, a UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women was appointed. See
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, http:/www.
ohchr.org/english/issues/womenrapporteur/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2005). Also in 1994, the
Program of Action produced by the UN-sponsored International Conference on Population and
Development in Cairo explicitly affirmed that "[r]eproductive health therefore implies that
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Coalitions among women and across the divides of North and South, East and
West, were formed to produce constructive results at the key moments of the
1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna,25 the 1994 International
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo,26 and the 1995
Fourth World Conference on Women (FWCW) in Beijing.27 The success of
the negotiations around different women's needs and in the face of strong
opposition from fundamentalist religious groups (whether Christian, Islamic,
or others) led to the term of most productive currency being that of "reproduc-
tive rights."
Paradoxically, the commitment signified through these conventions has
resulted in little effective action to transform the broader social context that
obstructs reproductive rights and engenders sexual harm.28 Sexual rights have
found considerable purchase when rooted in the incontestability of the need for
protection from sexual harm. Consequently, connections between reproductive
health and human rights have been developed with some considerable success.
But as Alice Miller cautions, women's rights, and sexual rights more broadly,
have also been constrained by their reliance on notions of sexual harm and
reproductive health as the inherent demand for protection of women exists in
people are able to have a satisfying and safe sex life;" the Program went further in recognizing
that reproductive health care "includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement
of life and personal relations, and not merely counselling and care related to reproduction and
sexually transmitted diseases." Programme of Action of the UN ICPD, Ch. VII: Reproductive
Rights and Reproductive Health, Basis for Action, 7.2, http://www.iisd.ca/Cairo/program/
p07002.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).
For discussion of the engagement of sex worker rights organizations in the North and
South, see GLOBAL SEX WORKERS: RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND REDEFINITION 167-225 (Kamala
Kempadoo & Jo Doezema eds., 1998).
For the suggestion that the increasingly global association of women's organizations
fueled the possibility of UN support, see Jutta M. Joachim, Shaping the Human Rights Agenda:
The Case of Violence Against Women, in GENDER POLrTICs IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 143-60
(Elisabeth Prugl & Mary K. Meyer eds., 1999).
25 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, World Conference on Human
Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu5/wchr.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).
26 United Nations International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), http://
www.iisd.ca/cairo.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).
27 United Nations, The United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, http://www.un.
orglwomenwatch/daw/beijing (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).
28 See Alice Miller, Sexuality, Violence Against Women, and Human Rights: Women Make
Demands and Ladies Get Protection, HEALTH & HuM. RTS.: AN INT'LJ., July 2004, at 16, 16-47
(providing an excellent analysis of the limitations of the "social harm" model as a platform for
developing gendered and sexual rights).
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tension with the need for promotion of women's rights.2" A focus on harm can
deflect from and frustrate the more fundamental goals of empowerment and
agency that are required to transform the context in which harm occurs, as it
"tends to reduce women to suffering bodies in need of protection by the law
and the state, rather than as bodies and minds in need not only of protection,
but participation and equality."3 ° For Miller, this begs the question of whether
rights serve as mere remedies, or whether they should be seen as potentially
transformative, in tackling the broader relations of social and economic power
that frame sexual politics.3" The real provision of sexual rights (e.g., assuring
a woman's ability to control her own reproductive life and the broader
possibility that people might associate sex with pleasure rather than compul-
sion) clearly depends on challenging the conditions that facilitate exploitation
(whether economic or other) and discrimination (racial, gendered, etc.) at a
trans-national level. The current global context of human rights would suggest
that we are only at the beginning of such an ambitious project.
V. NON-REPRODUCTIVE SEX AND THE DIFFICULTIES OF
NOT BEING CHASTE
It is undeniable that claims based on "reproductive rights" have enjoyed a
measure of strategic success. This success is precisely the result of their not
extending far into the terrain of this more ambitious project. Framing claims
around sexuality as "reproductive rights" keeps the discussion primarily within
the paradigm of the biological. While this approach has achieved some
consensus around women's rights to control their own fertility, it also
significantly limits the analysis to that of reproductive sex, excluding the
(often more) contentious arena of non-reproductive sex. Moreover, by
focusing on the biological, there is the possibility of eliding the fact that it is,
in the end, the social and cultural construction and management of that biology
that is at issue. A focus on reproductive rights tends to engage with only the
more privileged (i.e., 'legitimized' procreative heterosexual relations) sections
of the sexual hierarchies that Gayle Rubin noted were constituted through
stereotype, law, and convention.32 By marginalising that sex which is not
29 Id.
30 Id. at 25.
31 See id. at 27-3 1.
32 Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in
PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267-319 (Carole Vance, ed., 1984)
(providing an early analysis of sexual stereotypes and their significance in determining levels of
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reproductive, this approach successfully engages those (e.g., religious
fundamentalists) who would rather not countenance discussion of ("illegiti-
mate") sex as pleasure, and so presents a key method of building a broad-based
consensus. But it simultaneously fails to address the rights of those whose
sexual behavior does not fit within a reproductive paradigm, who do not fit the
chaste model of the innocent victim,33 and who are often most vulnerable to
sexual exploitation and discrimination.
There are two specific groups of people whose exclusion from this
approach it is worth considering here: sex workers and people who identify as
lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgender (l/g/b/t). The difficult task of addressing the
broader context within which sexuality operates is clearly reflected in the
struggles around the provisions pertaining to sex work in the UN Trafficking
Protocol. 4 Both feminist lobbyists and state delegates were divided over the
issue of whether prostitution could be seen as legitimate labor (in which case
sex workers would have access to rights protecting their working conditions
and their migration for work would be subject to the same protections and
restrictions as any other form of labor) or whether prostitution should be seen
through the model of sexual harm as an inevitable violation of women's human
rights (in which case, sex workers could not represent themselves as legitimate
workers in need of protection, but rather would be represented by others as
"fallen" or exploited women in need of rescue)." The pivotal concept around
which these two competing definitions battled, was that of "consent," an issue
whose determination relies on distinguishing those economic and social
contexts in which consent might be freely given from those where it is
acquired through compulsion. A failure to resolve this difficult question and
citizenship and status). The Rubin article laid much of the ground for subsequent work on
sexuality.
"3 Carole Vance and Alice Miller have written cogently on the difficulty of representing
experienced sexual agents as requiring protection of their sexual rights, when the most successful
claims of sexual rights invoke narratives of innocence and respectability in their representation
of victimization. The danger of this model is that complying with this imperative of respectabil-
ity will simply reinforce the hierarchies that are fundamental to so many forms of sexual
exploitation. See Alice Miller & Carole Vance, Sexuality, Human Rights, and Health, HEALTH
& HUM. RTs.: AN INT'L J., July 2004, at 11; Miller, supra note 28.
' Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, openedfor signature Dec. 12,2000, G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No.
49, Annex 2, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Vol. 1) (2001).
" Jo Doezema, Now You See Her, Now You Don't: Sex Workers at the UN Trafficking
Protocol Negotiations, Soc. & LEGAL STuD., Mar. 2005, at 61, 61-89.
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focus on the broader issues of equity in international migration and conditions
of labor is unsurprising when one considers that it demands that sex work be
considered outside the realm of morality and away from the issues of
monogamy, family, and women's chastity that so frequently frame its
discussion. This inability to deal dispassionately with sexual behavior that is
not chaste has led the Trafficking Protocols to become simply another tool in
the apparatus of control that may be exercised over trafficked people, rather
than an instrument that might serve to improve the conditions of their lives as
migrant workers.36
This difficulty in affirming the rights of those who are sexually active but
remain outside the legitimizing domain of heterosexual marriage is com-
pounded by a further factor. A key tension in the relationship between sex and
rights is that the regulation or acceptability of sexual behaviour and identity is
culturally variable. The concept of sexual rights brings to center stage the
tense relationship between claims to universality inherent in human rights and
cultural relativism of expressions of intimacy, reproduction, gender relations,
and identity that are so frequently central to national, religious, and moral
discourses. Claims to traditional culture or religious values are the most
frequent tools wielded in opposition to any development of hg/b/t rights.
While similar claims have been unequivocally rejected as a defense for other
forms of discrimination, this does not appear to be so clearly the approach
when it comes to issues of sexual orientation.
There are obvious problems in relying on terminology so associated with
Anglo-American culture such as "lesbian" and "gay," but claims of cultural
imperialism wear thin when local groups indigenous to so wide a variety of
regions repeatedly lay claim to this identity in order to express their own
particular sense of marginalization.37 The challenge to "traditional culture"
posed by rights of sexual orientation is rather argued to derive from the
fundamental principles that underlie these claims and that are inherent in the
broader implications of equity that adhere to sexual rights: principles of
36 Vanessa Munro, A Tale of Two Servitudes: Defining and Implementing a Domestic
Response to Trafficking of Women for Prostitution in the UK and Australia, SOC. & LEGAL
STUD., Mar. 2005, at 91, 91-114.
37 For more discussion on this point, see Oliver Phillips, Constituting the Global Gay: Issues
of Individual Subjectivity and Sexuality in Southern Africa, in LAW AND SEXUALITY: THE
GLoBAL ARENA 17, 17-34 (Carl Stychin & Didi Herman, eds., University of Minnesota Press
2001) (2000).
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autonomy, gender equality, bodily integrity, and respect for sexual and familial
diversity.
38
It is clear that issues of sexuality go to the heart of the position of women.
Any discussion of sexual rights implicitly involves a consideration of the
social position of women, as quite simply, the right to choose when, how, and
with whom one has sex demands that women, as well as men, have independ-
ent control over their sexual lives. This may sound simple, but in fact, it
makes sexual rights deeply contentious, as it inevitably challenges the
fundamental structures that reproduce social power in general. In many cases,
the debate around lesbian and gay rights is in fact a debate about the right of
women to exercise control over their own sexuality independently of a man.
This is a debate that gets invested with national identities, loaded with
resistance to neo-liberal economic policies, and lubricated with claims of
cultural imperialism. But at the centre of all the smoke and mirrors that get
positioned and repositioned around the pervasiveness of the homosex-
ual/heterosexual binary is a firm resistance to the possibility of women putting
their own desires before that of their parents and siblings.
For an example of this idea: in any culture where there is a form of
bridewealth or dowry (such as in southern Africa), the refusal of a woman to
marry has economic consequences for the entire family. Claims to lesbian or
gay rights therefore have disruptive economic consequences for the whole
family. In southern Africa, the refusal of a woman to marry will mean that she
does not bring any bridewealth into her family. Her brothers in turn have less
money with which to secure themselves good wives. Thus, a woman's sexual
choices have economic consequences for those around her, and that is why
historically, a woman's sexuality did not belong to her, but to her lineage. But
the advent of the colonial state and the introduction of state sanctions to
regulate marriage (insisting that women should consent to marriage and that
young girls should not be pledged into marriage), divorce (giving the women
the power to divorce their husbands if necessary), and adultery (making it a
criminal offence for women-although the practice of polygyny meant that it
could not be an offence for men) immediately transferred sexuality out of
lineage control.39 It introduced the notion of a citizen with rights and
obligations (however limited) in and to the State rather than to the ancestral
family and immediately invoked the notion of legal subjectivity, however
38 See Saiz, supra note 1, at 50.
39 Diana Jeater, MARRIAGE, PERVERSION AND POWER: THE CONSTRUCTION OF MORAL
DISCOURSE IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA 1894-1930, at 81 (1993).
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partial.4" Full legal personhood, however, implicitly includes the attendant
rights and responsibilities of sexual autonomy, making sexual rights an
inevitable end to the initial transfer from lineage to state control. The
development of the nation-state with citizens and state subjects is therefore a
context within which the question of sexual rights automatically arises.
Gender equality implicitly requires a recognition of the possibility of sexual
independence, and for that equality to be unconditional, it must inevitably
include the possibility of a same-sex relationship.
VI. CONCLUSION
The demand for sexual rights invokes far greater challenges of equity and
equality across multiple fields than might initially appear to be the case.
Sexuality is implicitly bound into and connected with a far greater number of
indices of social and economic power than we have historically assumed. This
could be one reason that sexual rights is occupying an increasing amount of
our attention in both international (whether through the UN or the WHO) and
national arenas (e.g., through debates on law reform).4 Nevertheless, the
progression and development of sexual rights is not constant so much as
contested, precisely because it demands that we articulate an ever more
inclusive, comprehensive, and complex understanding of the basis of rights.
Indeed the ground that has been gained through the media of health and harm
'0 For a more developed discussion of the history of "partial subjectivities" in relation to
sexuality and rights today, see Phillips, supra note 3, at 86-90.
41 Ignacio Saiz provides clear and detailed evidence, covering the last ten years, of a
considerable body of work done by the UN's expert human rights mecha-
nisms to develop international standards and hold states accountable for a
range of human rights violations based on sexual orientation. This progress,
however, is in stark contrast to the consistent denial and defiance shown by
governments at the more "political" UN forums such as the Commission on
Human Rights or the UN World Conferences ....
Saiz, supra note 1, at 50.
International human rights advocacy groups have demonstrated a similar increase in the
amount of attention devoted to sexual rights. For example, it was only in 1991 that Amnesty
International felt able to consider people imprisoned due to their sexual orientation prisoners of
conscience. In the last fifteen years, there have been numerous campaigns on the issue of sexual
rights. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, CRIMES OFHATE, CONSPIRACY OFSILENCE: TORTURE AND ILL-
TREATMENT BASED ON SEXUAL IDENTITY (2001); see also HUMAN RTS. WATCH & INT'L GAY
AND LESBIAN RTs. COMM., MORE THAN A NAME: STATE-SPONSORED HOMOPHOBIA AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/
safrica/afriglhrc0303.pdf.
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gives us some indication of the uncertain terrain that lies ahead and the
pressing need for a more lateral and considered approach to the complexity of
rights, particularly if we are to see rights as transformative rather than simply
remedial. The various arenas for the exercise of sexual rights considered in
this Comment suggest that we are merely at the start of a transformative
moment, with much of the narrative of sexual rights still to come.
